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In Saigon, 1974, South Vietnamese nationals and their families crowded around the
embassy, struggling to be on one of the last American helicopters out of South Vietnam. With the
withdrawal of American military support in early 1973, Saigon had fallen to the Communist
North Vietnamese forces, and anyone who had supported the South Vietnamese or the Americans
were desperately fleeing the capital city. The Vietnam War forever changed American
perspective on war, protest, the military, and government. Prior to Vietnam, America had never in the public perception - lost a war. The American withdrawal from the Vietnamese theater is
forever etched into the collective memory of the American citizenry, government, and military.
Technology played a pivotal role in the War, more so than in previous conflicts. In the
post WWII era, the United States emerged as a global superpower capable of sustaining a
massive military-industrial complex. This force was necessary to wage the large-scale force-onforce conflict that it fought in WWII and in Korea, and that it was prepared to fight against the
Soviet Union. Vietnam was the first truly-unconventional war in which the US was engaged,
being fought against enemy combatants who intermixed themselves with the population and did
not wear uniforms. As a result, the US had a massive technological superiority over the enemy
who did not have the military-infrastructure of a large state like the Soviet Union or the Axis
Powers had. However, this has led to the US being reliant upon its technological superiority in
order to win battles. This trend began in Vietnam, as the US still relied on its domestic
manufacturing capability as it had during the previous conflicts, and has continued to this day.
Currently, the study of the impact of technology on warfare centers around current events and
recently developed technology: drones, satellites, and surveillance technology. This is the result
of the last fifteen years of continuous war in the Middle East, which has inarguably been a
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catalyst to the development of military technology as a whole. The vast majority of the study on
the technology in Vietnam exists in academic writing was conducted in the 1970s and 1980s.
The helicopter was integral to the tactical, operational and strategic level operations in the
fight against the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong forces. The US’ reliance on the
helicopter in Vietnam is but one example of the general trend of the military’s over reliance on
technology in warfare. The more recent literature is not mired in the Cold War atmosphere which
deeply colored discussions of the Vietnam War. Most modern study of the helicopter is found in
compilation works centering around American military history, technology, or Vietnam; but there
have been few recent works addressing the helicopter specifically as it facilitated the campaign
strategy in Vietnam. The focus of this study is to view the helicopter as a tool of military strategy,
more than a piece of hardware.
Powered flight of any kind was unattainable and impractical until the development of
gasoline powered engines in the early 20th century. Many inventors, such as Thomas Edison, had
attempted to construct a helicopter. Even the Wright brothers tried – although they gave up after
deciding the concept had “no future.”1 While there were practical models which preceded it, the
XR-4 was the first truly practical helicopter built in the United States- its first contract being
awarded to Sikorsky in 1942.2 The development of the helicopter continued throughout the
Second World War, and helicopters were employed by both the Axis and the Allies, although not
on any large scale. The Vietnam War was the first war in which the helicopter was utilized as a
transport vehicle for soldiers in large numbers or in an offensive capacity. The only significant

!1Ralph P. Alex, How Are You For Fixed Blades?, in Vertical Flight, ed. Walter J. Boyne and Donald S. Lopez
(Smithsonian Institute: Washington D.C., 1984), 22.
2Ibid.
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use of the helicopter prior was the use of the Bell-47 as a medical-evacuation vehicle in the
Korean conflict during the 1950s, made famous by its appearance during the opening credits of
the popular sitcom M*A*S*H*.3 The historical question is whether the availability of the airmobility in the Vietnam War drove the strategy, or if the strategy drove the demand for new
technology. I believe that the availability of the helicopter enabled the overarching strategy of
attrition which the US Army waged against NVA and FLA forces in Vietnam.4
However, the helicopter was not the deciding factor in the strategic choices in Vietnam.
Air-mobility was not central to the strategy which the President and his Defense Department
eventually pursued, but came as a result of it, as the strategic/political level planners make
decisions that more often have indirect impacts on the battle space. The helicopter was a vital
part of the American strategy at the operational level, and aided battlefield commanders in
launching operations that would have otherwise required roads, or foot insertions into areas
unreachable by wheeled or tracked vehicles. The availability of the helicopter allowed the Army
to pursue its overarching strategy of attrition in Vietnam, by making it easier to maintain contact
with the enemy. In the context of Pentagon politics, the helicopter was important for the Army to
control more of the battle space than it would have had it not developed it’s own organic
airpower. The helicopter had significant effects on the decisions made by military commanders
in Vietnam, as it opened up the possibility of entirely new operations and forever changed the
landscape of the modern battlefield.

3Popular

CBS sit-com which ran from 1972-1983, featuring the antics of the doctors and nurses of the 4077th
Medical Army Surgical Hospital in Korea.
4The NVA is an abbreviation for the North Vietnamese Army, and FLA, or Freedom Liberation Army, here after will
be referred to as the Viet Cong, or VC.
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The widespread use of and reliance on the helicopter by American forces is indicative of
a much broader theme: the over reliance on technology by the American military. This being
such a broad theme in American military history, the scope of this paper is limited to the Army’s
adoption and use of the helicopter in Vietnam, and the Army’s ground war in Vietnam.
The primary sources principally stem from official US Army documents, such as the
findings of the Howze Tactical Mobility Board.5 The Howze Board was an official inquiry set
into motion by the Pentagon in 1962, in order to determine the viability—financially, logistically
and practically—of creating an air-mobile force borne into battle by helicopters. Official
documents allow a high-level perspective behind the “Big-Army’s” thought process in selecting
and applying the helicopter in their theater strategy in Vietnam. Other primary sources range
from personal memoirs of General Westmoreland, commander of US Military Assistance
Command in Vietnam (MACV) from 1964 to 1968, as well as other soldiers and pilots who had
company grade experiences during the War.
The secondary sources draw extensively from the large body of research and study
conducted immediately following the war during the 1970s and 1980s, when most of the study
on the Vietnam War took place. More recent scholarly studies have taken place, although most of
the study on the helicopter are smaller sections of larger compilations. The majority of the
secondary analysis is done by political scientists, historians and foreign policy experts. Experts
hailing from these fields bring a diverse set of biases and perspectives to the study, though they
tend to fall into two distinct categories. Contemporaries of General Westmoreland and high-level
planners tend to take defensive postures of the war strategy, as they all had hands in its execution
5US

Department of the Army, U.S. Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board: Final Report, August 20, 1962.
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and planning. Political scientists, scholars and most others are highly critical of the war strategy
and the campaign goals of the war as a whole; this group is in the majority.
The Vietnam War was America’s first “modern” war, with all the recognizable elements
which Americans today— now accustomed to watching combat footage in their living rooms—
recognize as elements of modern warfare: armored vehicles, automatic weapons, combat
fatigues, and now helicopters. The helicopter was as integral to America’s first battle in Vietnam,
in the Ia Drang Valley, as it was in evacuating the final Americans from Saigon in 1975. The
helicopter was the only vehicle which could have successfully inserted troops into remote
clearings in the jungles of Vietnam, and the only vehicle capable of facilitating the strategy of
attrition so successfully. The American military’s reliance on the helicopter was symptomatic of
the broader reliance on technological superiority over the enemy. Within the context of the Army
and a ground-war, this means the reliance on fire-support from the air and fire-support from
artillery pieces.
Politics and War
At the onset of any military operation, there is a mission statement. A mission statement
simply contains the “who, what, where, when, and the why” of the mission. A good mission
statement is concise, contains a task and purpose, and gives clear guidance and direction to the
organization. At the tactical and operational levels of the military, these mission statements are
written by commanders. At the national and strategic levels, missions are dictated by the civilianpolitical leadership. War is an extension of foreign policy, a tool for projecting will and power,
and not an end unto itself (hopefully). During the Vietnam War, the goals of the political
leadership were unclear, and unrealistic. The end state was to prevent the spread of communism,
!6

but how would this be measured? Was success in Vietnam a free and democratic South Vietnam,
or was it just a South Vietnam who could keep the North in check? The ambiguous political
goals of the war were, ultimately, what led to its failure.
The War in Vietnam was an extension of the Truman Doctrine, a post WW-II initiative
planned by American diplomat George Kennan, that equated to a zero-tolerance policy for the
spread of communism outside of countries already part of the communist bloc.6 Even in its own
time, the Truman Doctrine—synonymous with the containment strategy—was criticized for not
differentiating between nations of vital importance and those peripheral states whose political
bent had little effect on the global balance of power between the United States and the Soviet
Union. The fatal flaw of the doctrine, which treated a communist revolution in Cuba the same as
it would in Britain, is what brought the US military to wage war against an elusive enemy,
halfway across the world, for nearly a decade.
Prior to the American intervention in the early 1960s, Vietnam had been a French colony.
There was Vietnamese resistance to the French Colonial power in the region, which was partially
manifested as the Communist-Nationalist movement led by Ho Chi Minh. After nearly 80 years
of colonization, the Vietnamese forces defeated the French at the infamous siege of Dien Bien
Phu in 1954. After the withdrawal of the French in 1954, Vietnam was divided politically into the
communist North, whose capital was Hanoi, and the democratic South, whose capitol was
Saigon. When the communist state formed in the North, the United States became concerned that
instability may take hold in Southeast Asia, and that a domino effect would cause communism to
spread across the region.
6Office

of the Historian, “Kennan and Containment, 1947,” MILESTONES: 1945–1952, accessed May 16, 2016,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/kennan.
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The political goals for Vietnam were laid out by President Johnson in his address to the
American people on April 7, 1965. In this television address, Johnson addressed the growing
unpopularity of Operation Rolling Thunder, the codename given to the Air Force’s bombing
campaign over North Vietnam. President Johnson told the American people that we were in
South Vietnam to “keep the promise” that we had made to protect its independence since the end
of the Franco-Indochina War in 1954.7 In the speech, he lists several more reasons for our
involvement, including a fear of the “domino effect” of communism spreading throughout
Southeast Asia, starting with the fall of South Vietnam. President Johnson states that “our
objective is the independence of South Vietnam and its freedom from attack.”8 The below
excerpt from the speech is somewhat ironic considering the level of US military involvement
which would take place in Vietnam during the next 10 years.
Such peace[ful settlement] demands an independent South Vietnam -- securely
guaranteed and able to shape its own relationship to all others -- free from outside
interference -- tied to no alliance -- a military base for no other country.
These are the essentials of any final settlement. 9
It is not a difficult parallel to draw between the war in Vietnam and the Soviet Union’s invasion
of Afghanistan in 1979.
Both conflicts were characterized by a large, technologically advanced state invading a
technologically inferior state. In Vietnam, the NVA and VC never won in a force-on-force
conflict, and after the 1968 Tet Offensive they avoided such battles with US forces completely.
As General Westmoreland acknowledges in his memoir, A Soldier Reports, “in the face of

7Lyndon

B. Johnson, “American Policy in Vietnam” (speech, Washington D.C., April 7, 1965), American
Experience PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/vietnam/psources/ps_policy.html.
8Johnson, “American Policy in Vietnam.”
9Ibid.
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American airpower, helicopter mobility, and fire support, there was no way Giap (commander of
the NVA) could win on the battlefield.”10 Similarly, in Afghanistan the Soviets were unable to
overtake the Mujahideen, who waged a guerrilla campaign and forced a Soviet withdrawal in
1989. The Mujahideen were funded in part by the US: just as the Soviets had funded the
Communist North during the US-Vietnam war. In Afghanistan, as in Vietnam, technology alone
was not enough to secure victory.
The Vietnam War was the proving ground for the concept of air-mobility and its potential
was fully realized by the end of the conflict. Vietnam’s most lasting legacy, as far as the US
Army is concerned, is the application of the airmobile concept and the helicopter. The ability to
place soldiers in the field at nearly any given point on the map greatly expanded the options open
to battlefield commanders, and proved to be particularly useful when fighting an enemy that
refused to be static. North Vietnamese forces waged a guerrilla war against the large,
comparatively cumbersome American forces who relied largely on their technological advantage.
To characterize the war succinctly as a war of attrition, or as an anti-insurgency, does not do
justice to the complexity of the conflict and is—to an extent—a simplification used by historians
to describe Vietnam.11 These characterizations may be true for certain campaigns, or for periods
of the war, but it is important to note that there were significant military initiatives that were
more comprehensive, and conducted outreach programs to the populace.

10William

C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (New York: Da Capo Press, 1976), 405.
Daddis, Westmoreland’s War: Reassessing American Strategy in Vietnam (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2015).
11Gregory A.
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Interservice Conflict and the Cold War Army
Before we can discuss how the helicopter was so influential on the American strategy in
Vietnam, it is important to understand why the helicopter was adopted in the first place.
Additionally, it’s important to understand why the Army—whose primary area of responsibility
within the Department of Defense family is to conduct unified-land-operations—by and large
was the service that fielded the largest number of helicopters in Vietnam. The helicopter’s ability
to fill a wide range of roles— enabled by its ability to land without an air strip and hovering
capabilities— made it ideal for operations in the rice-paddies, jungles and villages of Vietnam.
However, in order for the Army to field the helicopter it had several political battles to face.
The Cold War Army was forced to fight for resources, combat-roles and funding with its
sister service the Air Force. The interservice rivalry and power struggle with the Air Force made
the Army’s decision to adopt the helicopter a matter of politics as well as practicality, as the
acquisition would expand the Army’s role on the battlefield, as well as its budget. The prospect
of having an organic aircraft which could minimize the Air Force’s role in the Army’s ground
war, combined with the practicality of the machine itself, made the helicopter—and air mobility
— the path forward for the Cold War Army. The conflict stems from their separate roles, and
cultures which began forming when the Army first acquired powered aircraft in the early 20th
century, and culminated in the creation of a separate Air Force entirely following WWII.
The Air Force was created by the National Security Act of 1947, which split the Army Air
Forces (AAF) from the Army, creating the Air Force as a separate branch of the military. There
had been political pressure for an autonomous Air Force since the formation of the predecessor
to the AAF the Army Air Corps (1926-1941), especially as the missions of many aircraft no
!10

longer had any direct support role for the Army’s ground forces. 12 The National Defense Act
granted the AAF the autonomy it had wanted, however the Army retained a small fleet of fixedwing aircraft for troop-transport and close air-support, while the Air Force took over the
strategic-bombing, heavy transport, and air-superiority roles.
These roles were established in negotiations within the Department of Defense that were
conducted in Key West, Florida, in 1948.13 The final output of this conference was the document
entitled “Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” which delineated the roles
of the separate services. 14 The Army was authorized only whatever aviation assets were
considered “organic.”15 The Air Force, aside from the primary air-superiority role, was to
“furnish close combat and logistical air support to the Army, including air lift, support and
resupply of airborne operations, aerial photography, tactical reconnaissance, and the interdiction
of enemy land and communications.” 16 The Army lost control over the AAF completely, and was
left with a fleet of fixed-wing aircraft used mostly for observation and directing field artillery.
The Key West conference put the Air Force on equal footing bureaucratically with the Army, and
left the Army in a position without many organic air-assets until they seized upon the helicopter
as their primary air transport.
Dr. Ian Horwood, a military historian published by the Combat Studies Institute in Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, discusses the interservice conflict between the Army and the Air Force in

12US Army,

“Army Air Corps,” accessed May 18, 2016, https://www.army.mil/aviation/aircorps.

13Ibid.
14US

Defense Department, Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 21, 1948, http://
cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm/ref/collection/p4013coll11/id/729.
15Ibid.
16Ibid, section IV.
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his book, Interservice Rivalry and Airpower in the Vietnam War.17 Horwood posits that the Army
seized upon the airmobile concept—and the acquisition of the helicopters required for the
airmobile concept—as a means of retaining resources and authority within the Department of
Defense.18 Additionally, the Air Force was focused on its bombing campaign in North Vietnam,
and had little interest in supporting the Army’s ground campaign through providing significant
close air support or light tactical transport. What air-assets were available were difficult to
coordinate, and therefore many times late to engagements which often lasted only several
minutes. The Air Force did retrofit C-47 cargo planes for close air support by fitting them with
Gatling-guns, but the amount of “spooky” aircraft (as they were nicknamed) was not enough to
fully support the Army’s ground mission.19 These roles were instead taken upon by the
helicopter, which the Army used to fill the role which the Air Force was unable or—more likely
—unwilling to fill as it focused its own resources on developing its bombing campaign in North
Vietnam. 20
Horwood and many other scholars attribute the Army’s quick adoption of the helicopter
as a means of regaining its former air-transport and support role from the Air Force in a move
driven by Pentagon politics. Morton Halperin, a foreign policy expert who served on the
Department of Defense during the Johnson Administration and the Vietnam War, has argued that
the helicopter was adopted in order to fill the close air-support role assigned to an Air Force

17Ian

Horwood, Interservice Rivalry and Airpower in the Vietnam War (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute
Press, 2006).
18Ibid, 89.
19Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 279.
20Horwood, Interservice Rivalry and Airpower in the Vietnam War, 89.
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which did not field any such aircraft to fill the role. 21 In his article entitled “The Key West Key,”
authored in partnership with his son David Halperin in 1983, Halperin asserts that the
helicopter’s vulnerability to ground fire, cost, and high volume of losses made it less effective
than fixed-wing aircraft.22 He cites that nearly one-third of the helicopters in the fleet were lost
over the course of the War as the primary evidence of its ineffectiveness.23 Halperin believes that
the helicopter was in place due almost solely to the interservice politics inside the Pentagon.
Undoubtedly, the prospect of regaining the air-support and some transport role heavily
influenced the Army’s adoption of the helicopter. Within the Pentagon, the services’
bureaucracies exist in a state of anarchy in which they are constantly struggling in a zero-sum
game for funding. Halperin also asserts that the helicopter’s many roles would have been better
filled by fixed-wing aircraft. Fortunately for the US Army, Halperin had no hand in decisions of
military strategy. The helicopter, by all accounts but Halperin’s, was an invaluable tool in the war
in its roles as an attack, support and transport aircraft. Its ability to fly only hundreds of feet off
the ground, hover, and take off in limited terrain, made it able to provide air-mobility into
restrictive terrain that would have been impenetrable to fixed-wing aircraft, which always require
a landing strip to land and take off from. Indeed, the helicopter is the only aircraft which could
have transported soldiers into the swamps of the Mekong Valley, the highlands, and the dense
jungles. As I will discuss in subsequent sections, the helicopter was vital to the Battle for the Ia
Drang Valley, and the subsequent airmobile strategy which the Army utilized in its search-anddestroy mission during the rest of the war.
21Morton

and David Halperin,“The Key West Key,” Foreign Policy, No. 53 (1983): 114-130, http://www.jstor.org/
stable/1148563, 119.
22Ibid, 120.
23Ibid, 115.
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The Howze Tactical Mobility Board
During the Cold War, the US Army had not been training to fight an anti-guerilla
campaign deep in the jungles of South-East Asia, but a conventional, almost rehearsed war
against the mechanized hordes of Soviet soldiers who were expected to cross from East into West
Germany at a moment’s notice. Primary evidence of the Army’s Cold War mentality is found in
the Howze Tactical Mobility Board, as it denotes heavily that the US was still preparing to fight
a large-scale conventional war in Europe, and not an anti-guerilla campaign in Vietnam. The
Howze Board, or the U.S. Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board: Final Report, records the
results of the Army’s months long study into the role of Army aviation and aircraft requirements
moving into the 1960’s.24 The report is written for the highest levels of leadership in the US
Army: the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of the Army, and the Commanding General of US
Continental Command, the forebear of the modern day Army’s Northern Command.
The report has a bias in affirming the validity of the airmobile concept, as the Army was
actively seeking to acquire airmobile capabilities and bar the US Air Force—which had potential
to strip the Army of parts of this role— from acquiring it. Interservice bias is theme which
pervades military materiel acquisition in the US, which oftentimes can be a struggle between
services when their roles overlap. The report is largely a document which makes acquisition and
force restructure recommendations based on what the Army felt was necessary moving forward
into the Cold War. The report does acknowledge the limitations of the role which the helicopter
can accept, and calls for a review of Air Force requirements in supporting the Army’s ground
mission. The report fully supports the airmobile concept, the acquisition of millions of dollars
24US

Department of the Army, U.S. Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board: Final Report, August 20, 1962.
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worth of helicopters, and the formation and training of two airmobile divisions. Eventually, these
came to fruition in the form of the 11th Airmobile Test Division, and later the 1st Cavalry
Division which was reactivated and absorbed most of the 11th’s resources and personnel.25
The Army does acknowledge the possibility of fighting an insurgent force directly in the
Howze Board Final Report. General Howze found that the US had the possibility of fighting four
types of hostile forces: a “modern army,” an “oriental” army, insurgents, or “other”— a term
which the Howze report uses to encompass all other regions that were not currently in the US
sphere of interest, such as African nations and Latin America. 26 This finding does not prove that
the entire mindset of the Army was geared towards counterinsurgency. Indeed, the
recommendations in the report were read by select few personnel, however it does bring to light
that the Big Army had at least considered fighting counter insurgency. That being said, the Army
decidedly trained and prepared to fight only a conventional war moving into Vietnam and there
were few resources devoted to counter-insurgency training.
The Board ultimately decided the force-structure of the Army, creating airmobile
divisions and stationing them across the globe, and made air-mobility the way forward for the
Army in Vietnam. Horwood’s work draws heavily upon the Board in discussing the interservice
rivalry that led to the acceptance of the helicopter as its air vehicle of choice. Additionally, the
Army transferred all of its fixed-wing assets to the Air Force in 1962, the same year of the
Howze Board Final Report. 27 This left the helicopter as the only option left for retaining any role
providing its own air-support of any kind, and in having any “organic” air assets allowed it by

25Horwood,

Interservice Rivalry and Airpower in the Vietnam War, 112.
Department of the Army, U.S. Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board, 14.
27Ibid.
26US
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the Key West agreement from 1948. Ultimately, the findings of the Howe Board have had far
reaching effects felt well past the American withdrawal from Vietnam, as the helicopter remains
the Army’s preferred method of transportation today.

Turning Point: The Battle for the Ia Drang Valley
By 1965, the 11th Air Assault Test Division had been re-designated as the 1st Air Cavalry
Division. The reason for this re-designation is simple: the Army prides itself on tradition. An
Army unit is never truly disbanded, but rather it is “deactivated,” so that in a time of war it can
be reactivated and its heritage survives. The pre-1965 1st Cavalry Division was re-flagged as the
2nd infantry division, and the 1st Cavalry moniker was transferred to the 11th Air Assault
division, presumably to liken the helicopter and air-mobility to the horse and cavalry of the
frontier wars. 28 This is indicative of the Army’s vision for the use of the helicopter, in that it
would be used to bare shock troops into battle to overwhelm the enemy with speed and mobility,
as the horse-soldiers of the American Civil War had. This was done so that in 1965, the Army
had re-branded the air-mobility concept supported by the Howze Board, and tested extensively
between 1962 and 1965, as an “elite” Army unit, having heritage with both the airborne units of
WWII, and the heavily romanticized horse soldiers of the late 19th century.
The helicopter had already proven its capability as a medevac platform during the Korean
conflict, and air mobility had been tested in peacetime, but it was not until 1965 that the 1st
Cavalry Division and Air mobility was tested in combat. The Battle for the Ia Drang Valley,
which occurred in mid-November 1965, was the first large scale confrontation between
28Horwood,

Interservice Rivalry, 124.
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American forces in a strictly combat-role and the NVA. The 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment
(1/7th) had orders to conduct air-assault operations in order to search out and destroy the enemy
in the Ia Drang Valley.29 30 The battalion was airlifted by 16 UH-1D “Huey” helicopters into
landing zones, where they subsequently made contact with the enemy and engaged in a firefight
that lasted over three days. The resultant battle was a victory, in that the battalion managed to kill
an estimated 634 enemy soldiers while losing 79 of their own troops, according the official
After-Action-Report (AAR).31 However, at the conclusion of the battle the battalion was
extracted back to their home base in the vicinity of Pleiku, and held none of the territory they had
sacrificed 79 men to take hold of and retain through heavy enemy fire. This sort of action would
characterize much of the military action in Vietnam, in that territory—no matter how high the
cost paid for it—was abandoned after enemy contact had ended.
The helicopter lends itself easily to this type of battle, in that it is not designed to sit and
hold ground, or defend an area. It’s strength lies solely in its agility, in that it is meant to land and
take-off quickly: it is lightly armored and cannot afford to linger in landing zones. This is unlike
a tank or armored vehicle, which can withstand direct fire. The helicopter’s lack of ground
capability influenced the attritional strategy in Vietnam in that it does not lend itself to holding to
territory as much as, say, a tank.
The AAR shows that the helicopter did survive its combat trial, and performed all the
tasks asked of it. COL Moore, the commander of the 1/7th, praises the men and equipment of the

29Department

of Army, Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), AAR of Battle for Ia Drang Valley, 1st
Battalion, 7th Cavalry, Oral transcript of OPORD given by LTC Moore.
30An After Action Report is conducted following any military exercise, in order to determine what actions went well
and should be repeated, and what actions need to be improved.
31Ibid, 17-18.
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229th Medical Evacuation Battalion who provided air support to the 1/7th during the operation.
The 229th kept his men resupplied in the field, and the crews were able to land under enemy fire
to conduct resupply operations. The value of the helicopter was also crucial as a direct action
platform, providing fire support to soldiers on the ground as evidenced by another excerpt from
the AAR below.
Aerial Rocket Artillery is extremely effective especially if the pilots know the
exact location of the enemy… It has a tremendous shock effect on the enemy. The
thing about ARA that makes it more effective than artillery is the fact that it does
not have to be seen by ground observers to be adjusted… Quick accurate fire
support is the result.”32
The Battle for the Ia Drang was recognized immediately as having proved the validity of the
airmobile concept, and was the lessons learned were disseminated across the Army. In a letter
dated January 7, 1966, COL William Becker—the commandant of the Army Artillery School at
Fort Sill, Oklahoma, refers to the Battle for the Ia Drang as “a classic battle,” meaning that it will
be held up as an example of what a textbook air-assault mission looks like.33 COL Becker
continues to state that “air-mobility was the difference between the brilliant victory won, and the
probable loss of the initial force had it not been built upon rapidly be air assault units.”34 The
value of the helicopter is without question, based on the language of Colonel’s Moore and
Becker.
The precedent set by the 1/7th and LTC Moore impacted Army doctrine on air assault
through the rest of the war. COL Becker’s estimation that the Ia Drang would become a “classic”
battle proved to be correct: to this day the battle is held up as an example of what an air assault
32Department

of Army, AAR of Battle for Ia Drang Valley, 19.
Becker to MG Harry Critz on Jan 7, 1965, in AAR of Battle for Ia Drang Valley, 1st Battalion, 7th

33COL William

Cavalry.
34Ibid.
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should look like. The availability of the helicopter made the air assault strategy possible, a fact
which is obvious. However, an air-assault is a tactical or operational procedure, and does not
factor directly into the national foreign-policy level of planning. The policy goals of President
Johnson, as summarized in his speech from April 7, 1965 and analyzed in the previous section,
would likely have remained the same irregardless of whether the Army had adopted the
helicopter or had chosen to rely on air support from the Air Force.
At the level at which the executive branches of government operate, the military is a
gargantuan tool which they may apply in an effort to achieve political goals. The concern of the
executive and policy making should generally not be the specific means and equipment which
the military uses to achieve its goal, with obvious exceptions to this being weapons of mass
destruction or other weapons with additional ramifications if they are used. The helicopter was
not a factor at the broad political level, however it was absolutely vital to the Army planners
tasked with executing the ground war in South Vietnam. In this, we see the difference between
political strategy and military strategy. Military planners in Vietnam were asked to use the
military to achieve political goals, as the military so often is.
The Battle for the Ia Drang proved not only the validity of air-mobility, but also
demonstrated the American reliance on technology to wage wars. COL Moore discusses how the
quick resupply and the fire support was the only difference between success and failure of his
mission. His operation, no matter how well planned, relied on the technological superiority
which his unit held over the NVA forces. It would be a foolish commander who would not take
advantage of material superiority over the enemy, however technology can be relied upon to the
point of being a fault. It is a general perception of the Vietnam War—in the view of many
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scholars—that the American military did not have a strategy, besides that of attrition and
destruction of the enemy. Compared to the NVA and Viet Cong forces—who relied on small
arms, systems of tunnels and their ability to blend into the population— the US forces in
Vietnam were cumbersome, slow to react, and reliant on technological superiority to decisively
win engagements. Reliance on technology proved to influence the American strategy of searchand-destroy, as the strategy relied on the helicopter to bring as much firepower and personnel to
bear against the enemy at any given point. In this way, the technology drove and was a deciding
factor in the tactical and operational level of strategy but not theater/national level, as discussed
earlier.
Precedence of Strategy
Military planners in Vietnam had envisioned the War to unfold like the more recent
conflicts which the US had fought on the Korean peninsula and in Europe. In these types of
conflicts, there were large ground campaigns between conventional forces, the enemy wore
uniforms and behaved somewhat predictably. The unconventional forces which the American
military were forced to engage for the majority of the Vietnam Conflict created a need for
American forces to react or alter their doctrinal tactics, techniques and procedures with which
they had trained. However, the body of scholars who have studied American strategy in the War
have found that military planners failed to adapt their conventional mindset to effectively fight
North Vietnamese forces. The helicopter having taken on new roles in the Vietnam conflict
allowed military commanders to plan their strategy knowing that they had the helicopter
available. This being the case, it was utilized in the same way that it would have been within the
context of a more conventional conflict.
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There is a great deal of scholarly research which has been done to explain the broader
trends in American military history. This section will highlight the most prominent historians
who have written on the topic, their theses and how their works are pertinent to Vietnam. I will
then place my thesis within the conversation which these gentleman have been having over the
course of the past several decades.
Military historian, former Professor of History at Temple University, and lauded author
Russell Weigley’s American Way of War is a history of American military strategy which
chronicles the United States military strategy from a general perspective.35 The larger theme of
his book is that in its military strategy spanning history, the US has made its objective to
annihilate enemy forces completely, rather than to seek less total—and therefore less costly—
victories.36
In the early years of America’s involvement in Vietnam, American forces were still
characterized as being in an advisory role to the South Vietnamese Army. Weigley attributes part
of the “mission creep” 37 and increased military activity to the aggressive nature of the American
military culture.38 Weigley states that throughout America’s history, US forces rarely remained in
a defensive posture when more aggressive avenues were available to them. 39 The focus of
American strategy shifted early in the War from advising and supporting South Vietnamese
forces to denying the enemy freedom of movement and emerging into an active combat role.
35Russell

F. Weigley,The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New York:
Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1973).
36Weigley, American Way of War, 463.
37“Mission creep” is the gradual increase of military activity, which often began as an advisory or supporting role,
over a period of time.
38Norman Schwarzkopf, later the Commander of CENTCOM during Desert Storm, was an adviser to South
Vietnamese forces during his first tour of duty in Vietnam in 1965 and his later career was heavily influenced by his
experiences in Vietnam.
39Weigley, The American Way of War, 464.
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This, in turn, translated into increasing offensive operations in South Vietnam, and ultimately
shifting the strategy of the War from a limited advisory role to a committed war against the
enemy.40 Weigley’s thesis revolves around the continuing American tradition of total victory,
which he defines as complete destruction of enemy forces, applied in Vietnam.41 The discrepancy
between Weigley’s thesis, of American forces seeking total destruction, and the political goals set
forth by President Johnson, which was to contain the North Vietnamese threat, is clear. The
pervasive American mindset being that “the best defense is a good offense,” is a common
heuristic that has guided American foreign policy in the post-WWII era. The helicopter even
transformed itself from a utility aircraft in Korea to an offensive weapon during Vietnam, as it
took on attack and transport roles, bringing to fruition the above heuristic.
Robert Schulzinger's A Time for War provides a general overview of the US path to war.42
Schulzinger argues that American technology drove the strategy for the war as much as logic. 43
He asserts that since the new technology saved American lives, planners also believed it would
be effective in other roles; additionally, that the campaign rested on America’s ability to out
manufacture enemy forces.44 Succinctly put, Schulzinger states: “the US fought the war it did
because it possessed abundant air power, mobility, technology, and firepower.”45 Similar to the
“logic” which Schulzinger posits governed the strategy in tandem with technology, Palmer
argues, in The McNamara Strategy and the Vietnam War that Robert McNamara’s leadership led

40Weigley,

The American Way of War, 464.
466.
42Robert Schulzinger, A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1997).
43Schulzinger, A Time for War, 182.
44Ibid, 182.
45Ibid, 183.
41Ibid,
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to quantification of the war, almost akin to keeping score of a basketball game except instead of
tracking baskets, the score is comprised of casualties.46 McNamara’s rationalist strategy is an
extension, and one of the consequences, of bureaucratic “logic” that may make sense from a
Washington perspective, but not necessarily to servicemen in theater.
Dr. Krepenevich’s The Army and Vietnam addresses the doctrinal choices made in
Vietnam, and the logic employed in reaching those decisions. 47 Krepenevich poses the idea that
the US was prepared to fight a large scale, conventional war in Vietnam just as it had in Korea,
and WWII. These victories affirmed the conventional methods of war in the American military’s
mindset as being the avenue for success in conflict, and became “deeply embedded in the
service’s psyche, conventional operations held sway over the Army even as its civilian superiors
lost faith in their effectiveness,” as Krepenevich phrased it.48
The strategy of attrition in Vietnam was the strategy by default, and Krepenevich explains
the rationale behind it at length, using both reasoning directly from the mouths of American
generals, as well as historical rationale. The historical rationale, which is more directly from the
mouth of Krepenevich than the generals, is summarized in the quote below.
The sheer weight of American materiel and resources seemed sufficient to the military
leadership to wear down the North Vietnamese and their VC Allies; thus, strategy was
not necessary. All that was needed was efficient application of firepower. It had worked
against the Japanese and the Germans in World War II and had worked against the
Chinese in Korea. It would be tried again in Vietnam.49

46Gregory

Palmer, The McNamara Strategy and the Vietnam War: Program and Budgeting in the Pentagon,
1960-1968 (Westport: Greenwood Press,1978).
47Andrew Krepenevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986).
48Ibid, 165.
49Ibid, 466.
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The American forces in WWII and Korea had fought to hold territory, to seize and to defend
ground. However, American forces in Vietnam rarely held ground once it was captured, electing
to return to their base. This technique supports Weigley’s thesis that Americans have historically
fought for complete destruction of enemy forces. In contrast, Krepenevich in the quote above
fails to take into account the effect that actually holding objectives and terrain had on America’s
previous conventional wars. There was generous application of military materiel in Korea and
WWII; the winners of these wars were decided almost as much by the domestic manufacturing
capabilities of each nation as their military or strategic prowess.
Krepenevich’s thesis, that American military forces rely on overwhelming technological
superiority to win their wars, is well founded. Tactically, American strategy in Vietnam centered
around trying to bring about its fire superiority to bear against the enemy. Most often, the
difficulty was simply in trying to locate, make, and maintain contact with the enemy. However,
Krepenevich’s excerpt above is a gross oversimplification of American strategy, which was more
comprehensive. General Westmoreland’s memoir—a summary and further analysis of which is
in the following section— details his threefold strategy which included offensive operations,
training ARVN forces, and pacification of the civilian population.50 However, the offensive
search-and-destroy operations are what received most of the public’s attention—as well as the
helicopter.
An important distinction which I believe that these scholars fail to make is that between
military and political strategy. Krepenevich, Weigley, and Schulzinger—in broad terms—state

50Westmoreland,

A Soldier Reports, 14.
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that the American strategy was reliant on overwhelming firepower. However, they discount
entirely the civil programs which were a part of the American presence in Vietnam.

A Soldier Reports: General Westmoreland’s War in Vietnam
Perhaps one of the most important primary sources available on the war comes from one
of its architects, General Westmoreland, in his memoir on the Vietnam War, A Soldier Reports.
Westmoreland largely blames the results of the war not on his command but rather on the
American media portrayal of events in the war and the failures of the civilian leadership. His
writing focused on the internal political struggles he faced in fighting the war: this is where he
believed the war was lost. His memoir is useful for looking at the political struggles faced by the
Army in Washington. Westmoreland emphatically defends the conduct of American servicemembers throughout his account, at no point placing blame for the defeat on them or their
actions. All of the blame for the results of the conflict is diverted to external sources, however he
reserves none of the blame for himself.
The bias in General Westmoreland’s work is clear, as his tone often borders on defensive.
This source provides a high-level, strategic explanation of the ground campaign in Vietnam
unlike many other sources written by company or field grade officers. The perspective of a
general officer in understanding the conflict, especially one of the architects of the battle
strategy, is invaluable to the study of the war as a whole, but particularly useful to the searchand-destroy campaign which was waged against the Viet-Cong and North Vietnamese Army.
Westmoreland, at several points in the book, discusses how the strategy of the War might have
changed had the political winds shifted.
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The war still could’ve been brought to a favorable end following defeat of the
enemy’s Tet offensive in 1968… had President Johnson changed our strategy and
taken advantage of the enemy’s weakness to enable me to carry out operations we
had planned… doubtless the North Vietnamese would been broken.51
The above excerpt is one example of Westmoreland’s characterization of the war. First of all, it is
indicative of a prevailing theme of his memoirs that the war was winnable. Westmoreland firmly
believed that, given more latitude in fighting the war and more control, the Army had the
resources and ability to fight and win the war.
Westmoreland pins the blame for Vietnam on several failures. First, he blames the
political leadership. Their faults lie in the micromanagement of the war, and the lack of clarity in
their goals for Vietnam. Additionally, he explains that the lack of transparency with which
President Johnson portrayed the War contributed to the public outcry to end the war. This ties
heavily into the media portrayal of the war, which lost Westmoreland the support of the people.
Westmoreland blames the lack of a unified command, as he explains that there were essentially
five separate “commanders”— CINCPAC, COMUSCAV, and the American ambassadors to
Thailand, Laos and South Vietnam—instead of a single unified command who could have
successfully operated under broad political guidance.52
Westmoreland envisioned a strategy for the war which he called a combined militarypolitical effort. He had three main goals: clearing out the insurgents in order for the civilian
agencies to operate, securing the region, and then conducting offensive operations. 53 However,
the focus of his efforts were the offensive operations, which he simply calls “search-and-

51Westmoreland,

A Soldier Reports, 410.

52Ibid,

410.
53Ibid, 35.
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destroy,” a term which the media used to characterize the war effort, and which was accurate in
describing combat operations, but not necessarily the entirety of the efforts.
Perhaps the clearest example of strategy driving technology within Westmoreland’s
memoir is that of the helicopter-gunship. American forces relied on close air-support during
ground operations, especially during the larger scale engagements which occurred prior to the Tet
Offensive. Westmoreland explained that it was Washington policy that American fighter-pilots
could only provide air-support with a Vietnamese pilot on board.54 He continued to explain that
ground troops believed that “they could count on quicker support from US Army helicopters,
even though in those days there were no true helicopter gunships.” 55 During this period, the
standard UH-1 “Huey” helicopter was jury-rigged by ground crews with additional armaments in
order to facilitate the Army’s need for dedicated ground-attack aircraft. In this way, the strategy
—in this case using helicopters as fire support— led to the development of new technology.
Dedicated gunships materialized in Vietnam when the Cobra attack helicopter came into service
in 1969, following the demand for such platforms. 56
I generally agree with Westmoreland’s assessment of the War, in that it was largely the
political leadership that caused the failure, not the military strategy. The lack of validity and
reliability of the South Vietnamese government perceived by Westmoreland is also a larger factor
in the lack of success of the war. Most scholars agreed with the public’s reception of the work at
the time it was published: Westmoreland shouldered none of the responsibility for ramping up
the War effort and puts the blame onto the media and politicians. There are more recent analysis

54Westmoreland,
55

A Soldier Reports, 86.

Ibid, 86.
87.

56Ibid,

!27

that has been more favorable towards Westmoreland’s command and strategic objectives in
Vietnam.
Conclusion: Technology and Warfare
The availability of technology determines the limitations and capabilities of Armies, and
is a significant factor in determining what strategy to pursue. The Mongol hordes under Genghis
Khan conquered East Asia utilizing the horse in battle. During WWI, the tank enabled the Allies
—and the Central Powers—to break the stalemate of trench warfare. In the modern context,
drones allow remotely piloted aircraft to observe battlefields, follow terror cells, and launch
missiles onto targets on the opposite side of the globe. War is a catalyst to technological
developments, as the perceived need for new equipment, weapons and transportation drives their
production and development. In Iraq and Afghanistan, we have seen the rapid development of
observation drones and an increased reliance on their capabilities for intelligence gathering and
—later in the conflict—direct strike capabilities. Similarly, the helicopter evolved from a utility
role into attack and direct action roles as the Vietnam war progressed and developed.
The helicopter was the US Army’s aircraft of choice for a number of reasons.
Pragmatically, the vehicle made sense. It was the only aircraft capable of inserting troops deep
behind enemy lines, replenishing their supply deep within the confines of the jungle, and
providing dedicated close air support. Bureaucratically, the helicopter allowed the Army to retain
its own “air force,” stripping several roles—along with funding and authority— from its sister
service from the US Air Force.
The airmobile concept was quickly validated early in the war by the actions of the 1st
Cavalry Division during the battle for the Ia Drang Valley in 1965 and from then on the
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helicopter was the primary vehicle for troop transport in-country, medical evacuation, and
became the preferred vehicle for close air support within Army units. From that point forward,
the Army would continue to pursue the airmobile concept as one of its primary efforts towards
fighting the North Vietnamese forces. The Ia Drang was a key battle for the advancement of airmobility, as it proved the validity of the helicopter in direct combat roles, and the helicopter
continued to provide support the American forces throughout the rest of the war.
Although the helicopter did not have a direct influence on political strategy and goals in
the region, it did impact military strategy; which is only a means of executing political goals. The
war was lost through ambiguous political goals and Cold-War rhetoric. The helicopter was
integral to the tactical, and operational level combat operations in the fight against the NVA and
VC forces by facilitating the search-and-destroy operations which the US Army primarily
pursued in its ground war in South Vietnam. This strategy would come to characterize the public
perception of the war, and be synonymous with an attrition strategy which the media and
politicians attributed to General Westmoreland. However, as Greggory Daddis points out,
Westmoreland’s strategy was more encompassing and included civil-support operations and an
extensive ARVN training mission. The widespread use of and reliance on the helicopter by
American forces in Vietnam demonstrates the trend in American military of over reliance on
technology, to the exclusion of sound political strategy.
As the US moves forward into new fields of technology, we must be wary of looking to
new weapons and surveillance equipment for the answer to our foreign policy woes across the
globe. We cannot “carpet-bomb” or air-assault our way to peace, or stability. The end state in
Vietnam—stability—was not able to be achieved through force of foreign arms, no matter how
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effective or influential any new piece of technology may be. Technology is inherently limited to
not only the skill of the end-user, but the government who deploys the equipment to achieve its
political goals.
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